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ROBERT B. LYNN, 
                                   Appellant 
                   
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-09-cr-00279-003) 
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch 
___________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 26, 2012 
 
Before:    HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.  
 
(Opinion Filed:  March 11, 2013) 





VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 At issue in this appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying Appellant 
Robert B. Lynn‟s motion for a mistrial based upon the Government‟s reference to Lynn‟s 
ability to testify when arguing an evidentiary objection in the presence of the jury, and 
whether the District Court‟s curative instruction regarding the Government‟s comment 
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was adequate.  Also at issue is whether the District Court improperly punished Lynn for 
exercising his right to proceed to trial by imposing a lengthier prison term than was 
imposed on a co-defendant who pled guilty.  Finding no error in the District Court‟s 
denial of Lynn‟s motion for a mistrial, curative instruction or sentence, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Since we write principally for the parties, we set forth only the facts essential to 
our analysis. 
Lynn was charged with multiple counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), wire 
fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), and bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344), as well as one count of 
conspiracy to commit fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349).  The charges against Lynn arose from his 
role in an accounting scheme in which he and several of his coworkers at Le-Natures, 
Inc. (“LNI”) defrauded banks and investors.  The loss exceeded $660 million.  In essence, 
LNI, a beverage company, kept two separate accounting systems: one that was accurate 
and another that was inflated with false records.  Lynn and his co-conspirators used the 
false records to obtain loans and investments for the company.  Lynn served as executive 
vice president at LNI and at various times was LNI‟s chief sales officer, chief revenue 
officer, general manager, and board member. 
Lynn was the only one of the LNI officials charged in the fraudulent scheme who 
did not plead guilty.  During his trial, defense counsel cross-examined a Government 
witness about the identification of handwritten percentages on the bottom of a production 
forecast.  The witness, the former manager of production planning and inventory control 
at LNI, testified he did not recognize the handwriting.  Defense counsel then asked the 
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witness about a possible interpretation of what the handwritten percentages might have 
meant.  The Government objected and stated:  “Objection, Your Honor.  The witness 
doesn‟t know whose handwriting this is and is asked to be—speculate.  And if we had 
some factual basis, if Mr. Lynn wants to testify but—.” (App. 780.)  At that point, 
defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, which the District Court immediately 
denied. 
After completion of the examination of the witness and the dismissal of the jury,  
defense counsel elaborated upon the grounds for his motion for a mistrial, asserting that 
the Government‟s reference to Lynn and his ability to lay an evidentiary foundation if he 
wished to testify violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  The 
District Court took the motion under consideration.  Before the Court reconvened several 
days later,
1
 Lynn filed a renewed motion for a mistrial, or, in the alternative, for a 
curative instruction.  While the District Court denied the motion for a mistrial, it granted 
the motion for a curative instruction but chose not to use Lynn‟s proposed instruction. 
Out of the presence of the jury, the District Court read the instruction it intended to 
give.  Lynn did not object to the proposed instruction.  When the jury returned to the 
courtroom, the District Court gave that same instruction: 
Before we adjourned Tuesday, Mr. Farrell [defense counsel] 
asked a witness, Mr. Waller, some questions regarding 
handwriting on one of the exhibits, which was Government 
Exhibit 4062.  In the course of doing so, he asked the 
following question: Quote, now, if you look at these 
percentages, in your experience, do these percentages of 12 
percent, or the fifth entry, or fifth month of the year, was that 
                                              
1
 The trial was postponed several days due to the Trial Judge‟s illness. 
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roughly equivalent to, in your experience, what was sold in 
May as percent of the year?, end of quote.  Mr. Cessar 
[Government counsel] objected, stating, quote, objection, 
Your Honor.  The witness doesn‟t know whose handwriting 
this is, and is asked to be, and is asked to be -- and then, the 
word “to” was left out, speculate.  And if we have some 
factual basis, if Mr. Lynn wants to testify, end of quote.  You 
should remember that a defendant has an absolute right not to 
testify.  The fact that a defendant does not testify should not 
be considered by you in any way, or even discussed in your 
deliberations.  I remind you that it is up to the government to 
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  It is 
not up to the defendant to prove that he is not guilty.  
 
(App. 800-01.)  Lynn did not raise an objection after the curative instruction was 
delivered to the jury.   
Because Lynn ultimately chose not to testify at trial, the District Court also 
instructed the jury in its final charge: 
Remember that a defendant has an absolute right not to testify 
or offer evidence.  The fact that a defendant did not testify or 
offer any evidence should not be considered by you in any 
way or even discussed in your deliberations, I remind you that 
it is up to the government to prove the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  It is not up to the defendant to 
prove that he is not guilty. 
 
(App. 1765.)   Lynn did not object after the District Court gave the jury its final charge.  
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on seven counts of wire fraud, two counts of 
bank fraud, and the conspiracy count.
2
  The presentence investigation report prepared by 
the Probation Office calculated the United States Sentencing Guidelines range to be 324 
to 405 months‟ imprisonment based on a total offense level of 41 and a criminal history 
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category of I.  Lynn requested a substantial downward variance, from 324 months to a 
prison term of 150 months, a sentence he viewed as comparable to the 120-month prison 
term received by Andrew Murin, a co-defendant who pled guilty but did not cooperate 
with the Government.
3
  The District Court did grant the request for a downward variance 
based upon Lynn‟s age—he was sixty-seven years old—and his law-abiding prior 
history, but declined to go as far as Lynn requested.  Instead, the District Court imposed a 
prison term of 180 months.
4
   
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
A. 
 Lynn first argues that the Government‟s reference to his ability to testify at trial 
violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, warranting a mistrial.  
In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Supreme Court held that prosecutors 
may not make comments suggesting that a defendant‟s invocation of his or her right not 
to testify at trial is evidence of guilt.  Id. at 615.  “A remark is directed to a defendant‟s 
silence when the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the 
jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused 
                                              
3
 Two cooperating co-defendants, Donald Pollinger and Jonathan Podlucky, 
received prison terms of sixty months.  The remaining co-defendant charged in the 
indictment along with Lynn, Gregory Podlucky, received a sentence of 240 months‟ 
imprisonment. 
4
 The District Court also imposed a five-year term of supervised release and 
restitution of over $660 million. 
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to testify.”  United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 187 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  “In making this determination, we must examine the 
challenged prosecutorial remark in its trial context.”  Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 
1544 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).  If the defendant‟s constitutional rights were 
violated, we will not reverse the conviction if the error was harmless.  Id. at 1546.   
 While the Government‟s statement that “if we had some factual basis, if Mr. Lynn 
wants to testify but—,” (App. 780), during its foundational objection to defense counsel‟s 
question of a witness on cross-examination was not appropriate, we conclude that it did 
not rise to the level of a constitutional error under Griffin.  The Government objected to 
defense counsel‟s question of the witness asking him to interpret handwritten percentages 
on a production forecast.  The witness had already testified that he could not identify the 
handwriting on that document.  Therefore, presumably because the witness did not know 
the origin of the written percentages, the Government objected on the ground that the 
witness‟s interpretation of the meaning of the handwriting would be improper 
speculation.  Read in context, we do not find that the Government‟s comment about Lynn 
being able to provide an evidentiary foundation was “manifestly intended” to be a 
comment on Lynn‟s failure to testify.  See Brennan, 326 F.3d at 187.  Rather, it appears 
that the Government intended the comment to demonstrate the lack of foundation on 
which the witness could base its interpretation of the handwritten numbers. 
Nor is it evident “that the jury would naturally and necessarily take [the 
Government‟s reference to Lynn] to be a comment on” Lynn‟s silence as evidence of his 
guilt.  See id.  As other Courts of Appeals have recognized, “„[t]he question is not 
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whether the jury possibly or even probably would view the remark in this manner, but 
whether the jury necessarily would have done so.‟”  United States v. Nelson, 450 F.3d 
1201, 1213 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1474 (11th 
Cir. 1994)); accord United States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 685 (5th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Carl, 978 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1992).  When examined in context, we do not 
conclude that the jury necessarily would have viewed the Government‟s remark as a 
comment on Lynn‟s failure to testify as evidence of his guilt.  Indeed, the Government‟s 
statement was not directed to the jury, but was instead made in the context of an 
evidentiary objection.  The remark was abrupt, being immediately cut off by defense 
counsel‟s assertion that the reference to Lynn being able to testify was improper. 
Even if we did construe the Government‟s remark as a comment on Lynn‟s failure 
to testify, the District Court‟s curative instruction was sufficient to render any error 
harmless.  After the District Court initially denied Lynn‟s immediate oral motion for a 
mistrial, defense counsel quickly finished his cross-examination of the witness and the 
Government conducted a short redirect-examination.  At that time, the District Court 
dismissed the jury at defense counsel‟s request so that he could explain the basis for his 
motion for a mistrial before the District Court adjourned for the day.  When the District 
Court reconvened after the District Judge‟s illness, the first thing the jury heard, after a 
brief explanation of the Judge‟s illness, was the District Court‟s curative instruction.  In 
that instruction, the District Court directly addressed the Government‟s comment and 
reminded the jury of Lynn‟s constitutional right not to testify, that a defendant‟s failure to 
“testify should not be considered by you in any way, or even discussed in your 
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deliberations,” and that the Government, rather than the defendant, had the burden of 
proof.  (App. 800-01.)  Clearly implicit in that instruction was the notion that the 
Government should not have made such a comment and the jury was to disregard it.  If 
any ambiguity as to the meaning or interpretation of the Government‟s remark existed, 
the District Court‟s curative instruction was sufficient to neutralize any error.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err in denying Lynn‟s motion 
for a mistrial. 
B. 
 Lynn also argues that his 180-month prison sentence created an unwarranted 
disparity, under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(6), with the 120-month sentence of a co-defendant, 
Andrew Murin, who pled guilty but did not cooperate with the Government.  Lynn 
contends that his sentence should have been 150 months, which he asserts would have 
been commensurate with Murin‟s sentence save for the reduction Murin received for his 
acceptance of responsibility.   
Although the District Court did vary downward from the 324 to 405-month 
Guidelines range based on Lynn‟s age and previously law-abiding background, it rejected 
Lynn‟s request for a 150-month sentence.  The District Court noted that Murin‟s and the 
other co-defendants‟ sentences were based on their negotiated agreements with the 
Government.  The District Court further explained: 
The defendant chose to put the government to the burden of 
proving his guilt, rather than accept responsibility for his 
actions.  In this case, that is no small thing, as the month-long 




He cannot choose to take the risk of trial, and then, assert that 
he is entitled to the benefit of the same sentences his co-
defendants negotiated with the government.  Thus, any 
disparities between the defendant‟s sentence and those of his 
co-defendants are not unwarranted. 
 
(App. 1878.)  Based on those comments, Lynn argues that the District Court penalized 
him for exercising his right to go to trial.   
 We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse 
of discretion.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
5
  “[I]f 
the district court‟s sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided.”  Id. at 568. 
 Lynn does not challenge the procedural reasonableness of his sentence.  Lynn 
argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because it was sixty months 
longer than a co-defendant who pled guilty but did not cooperate with the Government.  
We have held that “a defendant cannot rely upon § 3553(a)(6) to seek a reduced sentence 
designed to lessen disparity between co-defendants‟ sentences” because that provision 
“does not require district courts to consider sentencing disparity among co-defendants . . . 
.”  United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 2006).  In addition, because Murin 
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 The parties dispute whether Lynn preserved this sentencing issue in the District 
Court, with the Government asserting that we should employ plain error review and not 
the abuse of discretion standard.  Because Lynn‟s argument fails even under an abuse of 
discretion standard, we need not decide whether to review Lynn‟s sentencing under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard or for plain error.  See United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 
183 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We review the sentence imposed by the District Court for abuse 
of discretion except where it was imposed without objection, in which case we review 
only for plain error.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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pled guilty to one count of mail fraud, and Lynn was convicted of ten felony counts, 
including wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy, Lynn and Murin were not similarly 
situated, thus precluding Lynn‟s invocation of § 3553(a)(6).  Indeed, Murin‟s advisory 
Guidelines range was 210 to 262 months, whereas Lynn‟s range was 324 to 405 months, 
demonstrating that they were not at all situated alike.  Furthermore, if the starting point in 
the comparability analysis is the bottom of the respective advisory Guidelines ranges for 
Murin and Lynn, a sentence of 180 months reflects a 44% downward adjustment, 




Furthermore, we perceive the District Court‟s comments merely to have been an 
explanation for why it rejected Lynn‟s assertion that his sentence should have been 150 
months to avoid an unwarranted disparity with Murin.  As the District Court noted, 
because Lynn did not plead guilty and instead went to trial, he was not entitled to a 
sentence similar to co-defendants who accepted responsibility for their actions.  The 
District Court‟s explanation of the policy reasons for adjusting defendants‟ sentences 
when they accept responsibility does not amount to a “penalty” for Lynn‟s decision to go 
to trial. 
We find Lynn‟s 180-month prison sentence to be substantively reasonable.  The 
Guidelines imprisonment range was 324 to 405 months.  The District Court varied 
substantially from the bottom end of that range based on Lynn‟s age and previously law-
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 The sentence requested by Lynn, 150 months‟ imprisonment, would have 
represented a downward variance of 54%, a much greater reduction in relative terms than 
Murin had received. 
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abiding history.  Given the magnitude of the fraud and loss in this case, we cannot 
conclude that “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on 
that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 
568. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
